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Abstract 
Religious non-affiliation has increased considerably in the U.S. over the last few decades. The 
contemporary generation of emerging adults is the first to have a sizable proportion raised 
with no religious affiliation. This article uses nationally representative, longitudinal survey data 
to examine how both non-affiliation in adolescence and switching to non-affiliation in 
emerging adulthood influence political interest, behaviors, orientation, and partisanship. The 
results show the following: 1) that unaffiliated emerging adults are less politically active than 
the religiously affiliated; 2) that the unaffiliated are relatively liberal and unlikely to be 
Republican; 3) that the unaffiliated are more likely than the religiously affiliated to exhibit signs 
of political apathy; and 4) that there is little difference in political outcomes between those 
who switch to no affiliation and those who were unaffiliated in adolescence. The implications 
of these findings for the civic and political health of the nation is discussed.  
Keywords: politics, secular, religious non-affiliation, quantitative analysis, emerging adult 
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Introduction 
A recent feature article in National Geographic (Bullard) declared in its title: “The World’s 
Newest Major Religion: No Religion.” Indeed, religious non-affiliation has become more 
prevalent, both in the United States and around the world. With over one billion religiously 
unaffiliated people worldwide (Pew Research Center 2012), the unaffiliated now constitute the 
second largest religious group in almost half of all nations (Pew Research Center 2015a). In 
the United States, religious non-affiliation was relatively rare for much of the twentieth century 
(Glenn). This changed in the 1990s, when non-affiliation began to increase rapidly. The 
proportion of Americans reporting no religious affiliation increased from 7% in the 1980s to 
20% in 2012 (Hout and Fischer). The growth of non-affiliation is particularly relevant to the 
lives of adolescents and emerging adults. Not only are young Americans relatively likely to be 
unaffiliated, but the current generation of emerging adults is the first where a meaningful 
proportion of the generation was raised with no religious affiliation (Merino; Schwadel 2010a). 
The broader social implications of this religio-demographic shift remain to be seen. 
Religious identities are strongly associated with political perspectives and activities in the 
contemporary United States (Brooks and Manza; Wald and Calhoun-Brown). The population 
has become increasingly polarized along both religious and political lines in recent decades 
(Abramowitz and Saunders). Religious non-affiliation in particular is a highly partisan identity 
(Schwadel 2017). Although there is a relative paucity of research on secularity and politics 
(Wald and Calhoun-Brown), especially among adolescents and young adults (Pearson-
Merkowitz and Gimpel), what there is suggests that religious non-affiliation is associated with 
liberal perspectives and affiliation with the Democratic Party. Religion is also relevant to 
political interest and activity. Religiously active Americans appear to be relatively politically 
active (Peterson; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady). This suggests that religiously unaffiliated 
emerging adults may be less likely than other young Americans to participate in the political 
arena. The potential reciprocal relationship between religious and political perspectives 
(Patrikios) further complicates these associations. Some Americans disaffiliate from religion 
due to their political perspectives (Putnam and Campbell), which suggests that those who 
disaffiliate may differ politically from those raised with no religious affiliation.  
In this article, I test these propositions about the associations between religious non-
affiliation and politics in the contemporary emerging adult population. I use two waves of 
nationally-representative survey data to examine the effects of both non-affiliation in 
adolescence and switching to no affiliation in emerging adulthood on measures of political 
participation, affiliation, and perspectives. The results show that religiously unaffiliated 
emerging adults are less politically active than the religiously affiliated, that the unaffiliated are 
relatively liberal and unlikely to affiliate with the Republican Party, and that the unaffiliated are 
more likely than the religiously affiliated to exhibit signs of political apathy. Moreover, there 
is little difference in these political outcomes between those who switch to no affiliation and 
those who were unaffiliated in adolescence. I conclude by discussing the implications of the 
findings for the future civic and political health of the nation. 
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Unaffiliated Emerging Adults 
The United States is a relatively religious nation, particularly when compared to other 
advanced, industrialized democracies in the Western Hemisphere (Inglehart and Baker). 
Reflecting this high level of religiosity, religious non-affiliation was rare in the U.S. for much 
of the twentieth century, accounting for less than 5% of the population in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Glenn). The number of unaffiliated Americans increased moderately in the 1970s, but still 
less than 8% of the population was unaffiliated in the 1980s (Glenn; Hout and Fischer). Some 
researchers, particularly those working from the supply-side or “religious economies” 
perspective, saw this as evidence of the lack of secularization in the United States (e.g., 
Warner). Yet this began to change in the final years of the twentieth century. Religious non-
affiliation increased rapidly in the 1990s and into the twenty-first century (Hout and Fischer). 
According to the 2016 General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2017), 22% of American adults have 
no religious affiliation. While the rate of growth in non-affiliation is likely to slow, the 
unaffiliated are still expected to make up more than one-quarter of the U.S. population at the 
middle of the twenty-first century (Pew Research Center 2015b).  
The recent growth in religious non-affiliation is particularly relevant to the lives of 
adolescents and emerging adults. Historically, few Americans were raised with no religion. 
Instead, non-affiliation was largely in the form of apostasy, where adults switched from the 
religion of their childhood to no religion (Schwadel 2010a). There was a strong tendency 
among secular Americans to return to religion when they had children (Wilson and Sherkat), 
leading to relatively few children being raised with no religion. Across generations, however, 
there was a large increase in the proportion of Americans who report being raised with no 
religion (Merino; Schwadel 2010a). 
Figure 1. Percent Reporting No Religious Affiliation at Age 16 by Birth Cohort 
 
Notes: Figure based on data from the 1973-2016 General Social Survey; N=58,856; data 
weighted. 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
Pr
e 
19
00
19
00
-0
4
19
05
-0
9
19
10
-1
4
19
15
-1
9
19
20
-2
4
19
25
-2
9
19
30
-3
4
19
35
-3
9
19
40
-4
4
19
45
-4
9
19
50
-5
4
19
55
-5
9
19
60
-6
4
19
65
-6
9
19
70
-7
4
19
75
-7
9
19
80
-8
4
19
85
-8
9
19
90
+
Un
af
fil
ia
te
d 
at
 A
ge
 1
6
Year Born
Religion and Secularism 
 
 
 
Journal of Religion & Society  Supplement 17 152 
A brief examination of data from the 1973-2016 General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2017) 
demonstrates the prevalence of being raised with no religious affiliation among more recent 
birth cohorts. Figure 1 shows the percent of adult respondents, across five-year birth cohorts,1 
who report that they had no religious affiliation when they were 16 years of age. Among those 
born before the 1960s, fewer than 4% of most birth cohorts report having no religious 
affiliation when they were 16. The percent reporting no affiliation in adolescence then 
increases dramatically across birth cohorts. By the final cohort, born since 1990, 13% report 
having no religion at age 16. While this type of retrospective reporting is not without problems, 
it does suggest that the current generation of emerging adults is the first to have a relatively 
large proportion with no religious affiliation in adolescence. The question raised here is: what 
are the political implications of such non-affiliation during the formative years of adolescence 
and emerging adulthood? 
Religious Non-Affiliation and Politics 
Since the pioneering work of Alexis de Tocqueville, American social scientists have seen 
participation in religious organizations as a key form of associational life that promotes an 
active civic and political arena. Empirical research points to several ways in which religious 
congregations encourage political participation among their congregants. For instance, 
religious organizations provide opportunities to develop and maintain civic skills that are 
conducive to political activities (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady). The congregational context 
also supplies both motivation to participate in politics and knowledge about opportunities to 
be politically and civically active (Greeley; Harris; Lenski; Schwadel 2005; Wald, Kellstedt, and 
Leege). The social networks developed and maintained in religious congregations appear to be 
particularly important since messages conveyed in informal congregational networks 
encourage various forms of political participation (Djupe and Grant; McKenzie). Extant 
research thus suggests that non-affiliated emerging adults are disadvantaged in the political 
arena because they disproportionately lack the skills, motivation, knowledge, and network 
support to which regular churchgoers are exposed.2 
Such a proposition, however, is only conjecture since the relevant research pays little 
attention to both secular Americans and emerging adults. The small body of research on the 
political activities of religiously unaffiliated Americans has produced inconsistent results. For 
instance, Driskell, Embry, and Lyon find that unaffiliated adults participate in politics more so 
than both Catholics and Protestants. In contrast, Jones and colleagues find that unaffiliated 
adults are relatively unlikely to vote and to express interest in elections. There is an even greater 
paucity of research on youth/emerging adult religion and political outcomes (see Gibson for 
an exception). As Pearson-Merkowitz and Gimpel conclude, “[Q]uestions such as how 
religious participation as an adolescent may affect their political participation and beliefs as 
                                               
1 Those born before 1900 and since 1990 are grouped into their own cohorts due to the small number of 
respondents in the tail ends of the cohort continuum. 
2 Of course, the unaffiliated may sometimes attend religious services and thus benefit politically from such 
attendance. Nonetheless, on average, the unaffiliated attend religious services far less often than the religiously 
affiliated; for instance, more than 13 fewer times per year than mainline Protestants, more than 22 fewer times 
per year than Catholics, and almost 30 fewer times per year than evangelicals (Schwadel 2010b). 
Religion and Secularism 
 
 
 
Journal of Religion & Society  Supplement 17 153 
they emerge into adulthood, when ties to a church may wane or lapse, remain unanswered” 
(172). 
Although also largely ignoring emerging adults, research on non-affiliation and 
partisanship provides more consistent findings than research on non-affiliation and political 
participation. “Although seculars have not been subject to much research,” according to Wald 
and Calhoun-Brown, “it has been thought that the nonaffiliated tend to share the liberal 
political outlook of Jews and African-American Protestants” (33). Indeed, in their empirical 
analysis, Wald and Calhoun-Brown find that unaffiliated adults are relatively likely to identify 
as Democrat and to have voted for Barack Obama in 2012. Similarly, according to Jones and 
colleagues, the unaffiliated favor Democrats and third party politicians. Churchgoing is now a 
partisan activity (Kellstedt et al.), and recent research points to the partisanship of the 
unaffiliated in particular (Fowler et al.; Schwadel 2017). As Baker and Smith conclude in their 
thorough analysis of secular Americans, there is a “strong tendency among seculars to self-
identify as more liberal than the average American” (182). In the analysis below, I expand on 
previous research by examining the associations between non-affiliation and both political 
participation/interest and partisanship among contemporary emerging adults. 
Youth Non-Affiliation vs. Emerging Adult Apostasy 
The associations between emerging adults’ non-affiliation and their political orientations 
and activities is complicated by the potential reciprocal relationship between religious and 
political perspectives (Patrikios). I have thus far discussed reasons why religious affiliation and 
non-affiliation may influence politics, and indeed social science research on the subject 
generally focuses on the impact of religion on politics. Yet political perspectives may also 
influence religious affiliations (Hout and Fischer). Putnam and Campbell, for example, argue 
that the politicization of religion leads some Americans who are tangentially affiliated with 
organized religions to disaffiliate from religion altogether. This suggests that apostates – those 
who disaffiliate from religion – may differ politically from those raised with no religious 
affiliation. 
Research conducted by Green and Guth is particularly relevant here as theirs is the only 
research I could identify that looks at the effects of being unaffiliated in childhood on political 
outcomes later in the life course. They find that the unaffiliated in general are relatively unlikely 
to vote, but that those who were unaffiliated since childhood are particularly unlikely to vote. 
Unfortunately, their measure of childhood non-affiliation is a retrospective measure and, more 
importantly, their sample includes only 12 respondents who reported being unaffiliated in 
childhood. Consequently, the influence of non-affiliation in youth versus apostasy during 
emerging adulthood on later political interest and practices remains an open question. In the 
following analyses, I examine how both adolescent non-affiliation and switching to no 
affiliation during emerging adulthood are associated with political participation, interest, 
partisanship, and orientations. 
Data and Methods 
The data are from the National Study of Youth and Religion (NSYR). The first wave of 
the NSYR survey was collected by telephone in 2002–2003. A random sample of 3,290 U.S. 
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adolescents, ages 13 to 17, and one of each of their parents were surveyed in the first wave.3 
The response rate was 57%, according to Response Rate 4 as defined by the American 
Association for Public Opinion Research. Adolescent respondents were surveyed again in the 
fourth wave of the NSYR, in 2013, when they were between 22 and 29 years of age (N=2,071). 
There was 37% attrition between Waves 1 and 4. Wave 4 was administered primarily online. 
Waves 2 and 3 are not employed in the analyses in this article (see Smith and Denton for more 
information on the NSYR). 
Four dependent variables, from Wave 4, assess political interest and behaviors. First, 
overall political interest is based on the question, “In general, how interested are you in politics 
and public affairs?” Response options are: not at all interested (1), slightly interested (2), 
somewhat interested (3), and very interested (4). Second, “How often does the subject of 
politics come up in conversations with family?” Response options are: never (1), hardly ever 
(2), some (3), and a lot (4). Third, a dichotomous measure of voting in the 2012 election (0/1). 
Respondents who were ineligible to vote are removed from the sample when modeling voting. 
Fourth, respondents are asked if they plan to “vote regularly in [future] elections.” Response 
options are: vote because “it is personally what I want to do” (1), vote because “it is right thing 
to do” (2), and “would probably not” vote (3). 
Five additional dependent variables, also from Wave 4, assess political orientation and 
partisanship. First, political orientation is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 
extremely liberal (1) to extremely conservative (7). The roughly 18% of respondents who 
answered “don’t know” are removed from the sample when modeling political orientation. A 
“don’t know” response, however, may be substantively meaningful (Schuman and Presser). In 
this case, it may signify a form of political apathy, which is relatively common among emerging 
adults (Snell). Consequently, the second orientation/partisanship measure is a dichotomous 
variable indicating a “don’t know” response to the political orientation question (0/1). Third, 
a dichotomous measure of voting for Barack Obama in the 2012 election (0/1). Respondents 
who did not vote are removed from the sample for that model. Fourth, political party: 
Democrat (1), Republican (2), and Independent/other party (3). Roughly 12% of respondents 
“don’t know” their political party and are thus removed from the sample when modeling 
political party. The final dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of responding “don’t 
know” to the political party question (0/1). Similar to political orientation, a “don’t know” 
response to the political party question may have meaningful political implications by 
signifying political apathy. Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in Table 1. 
The primary independent variables assess religious non-affiliation. Two non-affiliation 
dummy variable are employed in the models. First, no religious affiliation in adolescence (i.e., 
Wave 1), which constitutes more than 12% of the sample. Second, switch to no affiliation (i.e., 
affiliated in Wave 1 but not in Wave 4), which constitutes more than 26% of the sample. The 
omitted reference category is those with a religious affiliation in both Waves 1 and 4.4 All 
                                               
3 The 80 respondents (in Wave 1) who comprise the Jewish oversample are deleted from the sample because the 
Jewish oversample is not a random sample, thus those cases cannot be weighted along with the other cases. The 
sample sizes reported here do not include the Jewish oversample. 
4 Eighty percent of those who were unaffiliated in Wave 1 were also unaffiliated in Wave 4. I examined two sets 
of alternative analyses to assess how respondents who switched from no affiliation in Wave 1 to religiously 
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models control for a series of relevant control variables. Gender is measured with a dummy 
variable for female respondents. Race is measured with dummy variables for African-
American, Latino, and other race respondents (white is reference category). Parent control 
variables are derived from the Wave 1 survey: a dummy variable for either parent graduating 
from college, and dummy variables for responding parent self-identifying as politically liberal, 
politically conservative, or “don’t know” political orientation (politically moderate parent is 
reference category). The remaining control variables are from Wave 4, and, with the exception 
of age, are all dummy variables: age (coded in years of age), married, children, live in the South 
Census Region, in college, graduated from college, and live with parent(s). 
I use a variety of regression techniques due to variation in the form of the dependent 
variables. These include OLS models for the one continuous dependent variable (political 
orientation), ordinal logistic models for the ordinal dependent variables (political interest and 
talk about politics with family), binary logistic models for the dichotomous dependent 
variables (voted, “don’t know” political orientation, voted for Obama, and “don’t know” 
party), and multinomial logistic models for the categorical dependent variables (reasons for 
voting in future and political party). The results section is divided into two parts: political 
interest and participation, and political orientation and partisanship. All models are weighted. 
Results 
Political Interest and Participation 
Results from regression models of political interest and behavior are reported in Table 2. 
The first dependent variable is overall political interest. Neither being unaffiliated as an 
adolescent (b=.08, n.s.) nor switching to no affiliation (b=-.02, n.s.) have significant effects on 
political interest. As the second model in Table 2 shows, both being unaffiliated as an 
adolescent (b=-.032) and switching to no affiliation during emerging adulthood (b=-.28) have 
negative effects on the frequency of talking about politics with one’s family. Specifically, being 
unaffiliated as an adolescent is associated with a 27% (e-.32=.73; .73–1=-.27) reduction in the 
odds of advancing one category on the measure of talk politics with family, and switching to 
no affiliation is associated with a 24% reduction in the odds of advancing one category on the 
measure of talk politics with family. Although religiously affiliated and unaffiliated emerging 
adults appear to have similar levels of political interest, they differ in their frequency of talking 
about politics with their families. 
Turning to the most fundamental aspect of democratic political participation, the 
remaining models in Table 2 examine voting and future voting intentions. The third model in 
Table 2 shows that being unaffiliated in adolescence (b=-.41) and switching to no affiliation 
during emerging adulthood (b=-.46) both negatively affect voting in the 2012 election. Relative 
to the religiously affiliated, the odds of voting in the 2012 election were 34% lower for those 
who were unaffiliated as adolescents and 37% lower for those who switched to no affiliation. 
                                               
affiliated in Wave 4 influence the results: 1) deleting them from the sample, and 2) recoding them as religiously 
affiliated (i.e. the omitted reference category). In both cases, the results are largely unchanged. The only exception 
is that in both alternative specifications the effect of unaffiliated as adolescent on “don’t know party” (see final 
column of Table 3) is no longer significant. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variables Percent (Mean) 
Standard 
Deviation N 
 Political Interest   (2.44)   0.99 2,000 
 Talk Politics with Family   (2.86)   0.85 1,990 
 Voted in 2012 Election   66.0%  1,974 
 Reasons to Vote in Future:   2,006 
    It is Personally What I Would Want to doa   57.2%   
    Right thing to do   29.9%   
    Would Probably not Vote   12.9%   
 Political Orientation   (3.95)   1.63 1,639 
 Political Orientation: Don’t Know   18.2%  2,004 
 Voted for Obama   55.8%  1,282 
 Party:   1,768 
    Democrat   29.1%   
    Republican   23.3%   
    Independent/Other Partya   47.6%   
    Don’t Know   11.8%  2,004 
Independent Variables    
Unaffiliated Adolescentb   12.2%  2,009 
Switched to Unaffiliatedc   26.2%  2,009 
Never Unaffiliateda, c   61.6%  2,009 
Femaleb   53.0%  2,009 
African Americanb   12.2%  2,009 
Latinob     9.3%  2,009 
Other Raceb     5.2%  2,009 
Whitea, b   73.3%   
Married   25.4%  2,009 
Children   30.2%  2,009 
Age (25.49)   1.49 2,009 
South   40.6%  2,009 
In College   22.3%  2,009 
Bachelor’s Degree   41.5%  2,009 
Live with Parent(s)   21.2%  2,009 
Parent Bachelor’sb   44.9%  2,009 
Parent Liberalb   18.8%  2,009 
Parent Conservativeb   35.4%  2,009 
Parent Political Orientation: Don’t Knowb   23.0%  2,009 
Parent Moderatea, b   22.8%  2,009 
Notes: Unless otherwise specified, variables are from Wave 4 of the NSYR. 
a: Omitted reference category in regression models. 
b: Wave 1 variable. 
c: Variable derived from Wave 1 and Wave 4 measures. 
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Table 2. Binary, Ordinal, and Multinomial Logistic Regression Models of Political Interest and 
Behaviors 
    Reasons to vote in futurec 
 
Political 
interesta 
Talk politics 
w/familya 
Voted in 2012 
electionb 
Right thing  
to do 
Would probably 
not vote 
Unaffiliated as Adolescentd  0.08 -0.32* -0.41*  -0.16  0.77*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.21) 
Switched to Unaffiliatedd -0.02 -0.28** -0.46*** -0.03  0.60*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.17) 
Female -0.59*** -0.00  0.15  0.10 -0.31* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.15) 
African Americane  0.10 -0.24  0.98*** -0.13 -0.73**   
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.17) (0.25) 
Latinoe  0.21 -0.27 -0.44*   0.01 -0.05 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.23) 
Other Racee  0.14  0.26 -0.04  0.42  0.36 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.29) 
Married  0.07  0.18  0.36***  0.05 -0.29 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.19) 
Children -0.19 -0.21 -0.28*  0.13  0.55** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.18) 
Age  0.10*** -0.02  0.04 -0.02 -0.08 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
South  0.31***  0.18* -0.14 -0.07 -0.21 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.15) 
In College  0.36***  0.37***  0.27*   -0.12 -0.55**  
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) 
Bachelor’s Degree  0.45***  0.19  0.69*** -0.27* -0.78*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) 
Live with Parent(s) -0.31** -0.03  0.21 -0.05  0.23 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) 
Parent Bachelor’s  0.21*  0.24*  0.08  0.08 -0.39*  
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) 
Parent Liberalf  0.28*  0.36**  0.38* -0.05 -0.09   
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.22) 
Parent Conservativef  0.04  0.36**  0.09    0.28* -0.06   
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20) 
Parent Orientation: DKf -0.22 -0.27* -0.24  0.37*  0.61** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.21) 
Constant  1.23 -2.97*** -0.54 -0.24  0.76 
 (0.73) (.76) (0.89) (0.91) (1.27) 
N 2,000 1,990 1,974 2,006  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
a: Ordinal logistic model. 
b: Binary logistic model. 
c: Multinomial logistic model, omitted reference category = “it is personally what I would want to do.” 
d: Religious affiliate in both Wave 1 and Wave 4 is omitted reference category. 
e: White is omitted reference category. 
f: Parent moderate is omitted reference category. 
*p<.05,  **p<.01,  ***p<.001 (two-tailed test) 
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The final model in Table 2 is a multinomial model assessing expected reasons for voting in 
the future. The reference category, which the majority of respondents chose, is “personally 
what I would want to do.” Non-affiliation does not significantly affect respondents’ likelihood 
of saying they will vote in the future because it is the right thing to do, rather than because it 
is what they want to do. In contrast, both being unaffiliated as an adolescent (b=.77) and 
switching to no affiliation (b=.60) positively influence the likelihood of saying will probably 
not vote in the future. Relative to expecting to vote because it is what they want to do, being 
unaffiliated as an adolescent increases the odds of saying will probably not vote in the future 
by 116%, and switching to no affiliation increases the odds of saying will probably not vote in 
the future by 82%.  
Overall, the results in Table 2 indicate that unaffiliated emerging adults are relatively 
unlikely to talk about politics with their families and to have voted in the 2012 election, and 
relatively likely to expect to not vote in the future. Post-hoc tests show that the coefficients 
for unaffiliated as an adolescent and switching to no affiliation from the models in Tables 2 
are not significantly different from one another. Control variables with consistent effects 
across models show that higher education is positively associated with political interest and 
activity, and having politically moderate parents is negatively associated with political interest 
and activity. 
Political Orientation and Partisanship 
Results from regression models of political orientation and partisanship are reported in 
Table 3. The first model shows that being unaffiliated as an adolescent (b=-.92) and switching 
to no affiliation (b=-1.05) both have robust, negative effects on the measure of political 
orientation (higher values indicate a conservative orientation). This equates to a .93 standard 
deviation difference in political orientation between the affiliated and those unaffiliated as 
adolescents, and a 1.06 standard deviation difference between the affiliated and those who 
switched to no affiliation. As noted above, more than 18% of respondents said they “don’t 
know” their political orientation. The second model in Table 3 shows that those who switched 
to no affiliation (b=.30), but not those who were unaffiliated as adolescents (b=-.03, n.s.), are 
more likely than the religiously affiliated to say they do not know their political orientation. 
Specifically, switching to no affiliation is associated with a 35% increase in the odds of not 
knowing one’s political orientation.  
The third model in Table 3 reveals large differences between the affiliated and unaffiliated 
in their likelihood of voting for Barack Obama in the 2012 election. Both being unaffiliated as 
an adolescent (b=1.14) and switching to no affiliation (b=1.48) have robust, positive effects 
on having voted for Obama. No religious affiliation in adolescence is associated with a 213% 
increase in the odds of voting for Obama in 2012, and switching to no affiliation is associated 
with a 339% increase in the odds of voting for Obama. 
The remaining models in Table 3 examine party identification. The fourth model is a 
multinomial model of party identification, with Independents and affiliates of “other” parties 
(the largest group) serving as the reference category. Neither no affiliation in adolescence 
(b=.31, n.s.) nor switching to no affiliation (b=.15, n.s.) are significantly associated with 
identifying as a Democrat rather than Independent/other party. Conversely, both no affiliation  
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Table 3. OLS, Binary Logistic, and Multinomial Logistic Regression Models of Political Orientation 
and Partisanship 
 
Political 
orientationa 
Don’t know 
orientationb 
Voted for 
Obamab 
           Partyc  
Democrat  Republican 
Don’t know 
partyb 
Unaffiliated as Adolescentd -0.92*** -0.03  1.14***  0.31 -1.01***  0.47* 
 (0.11) (0.21) (0.24) (0.19) (0.26) (0.23) 
Switched to Unaffiliatedd -1.05***  0.30*  1.48***  0.15 -1.40***  0.46*   
 (0.09) (0.15) (0.18) (0.14) (0.19) (0.18) 
Female -0.33***  0.17  0.64***  0.70*** -0.03  0.31*   
 (0.07) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) 
African Americane -0.65***  0.40*  3.99***  1.62*** -1.79*** -0.40 
 (0.12) (0.18) (0.38) (0.19) (0.36) (0.25) 
Latinoe -0.74***  0.15  2.07***  1.16*** -0.77**   0.63**  
 (0.13) (0.20) (0.32) (0.20) (0.29) (0.21) 
Other Racee -0.40** -0.04  0.81*   0.82***  -0.02  0.09 
 (0.15) (0.29) (0.33) (0.24) (0.32) (0.32) 
Married  0.60*** -0.15 -0.80*** -0.22  0.84*** -0.11 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) 
Children  0.19*  0.56*** -0.28 -0.36*  0.07  0.61*** 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) 
Age -0.08** -0.01  0.03  0.11*    0.02 -0.11* 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
South  0.22** -0.06 -0.77*** -0.04  0.58*** -0.06 
 (0.07) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) 
In College -0.01 -0.52**  0.15  0.05 -0.23 -0.60** 
 (0.08) (0.16) (0.17) (0.14) (0.16) (0.20) 
Bachelor’s Degree -0.26** -1.37***  0.45**  0.16 -0.05 -0.97*** 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.20) 
Live with Parent(s) -0.09  0.10  0.04  0.10  0.13  0.18 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.19) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) 
Parent Bachelor’s -0.09 -0.48**  0.30    0.16 -0.14 -0.03 
 (0.08) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.17) 
Parent Liberalf -0.37*** -0.54**  0.52*   0.43*  -0.80**  -0.86*** 
 (0.11) (0.20) (0.22) (0.17) (0.27) (0.26) 
Parent Conservativef  0.69*** -0.59*** -1.31*** -0.86***  0.58*** -0.33  
 (0.09) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.20) 
Parent Orientation: DKf  0.25*  0.08 -0.10  0.03 -0.27  0.18 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.23) (0.18) (0.23) (0.20) 
Constant  6.24*** -0.81 -1.28 -3.98*** -1.12  0.68 
 (0.62) (1.09) (1.31) (1.08) (1.23) (1.29) 
N 1,639 2,004 1,282 1,768  2,004 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
a: OLS model. 
b: Binary logistic model. 
c: Multinomial logistic model, omitted reference category = Independent/other party. 
d: Religious affiliate in both Wave 1 and Wave 4 is omitted reference category. 
e: White is omitted reference category. 
f: Parent moderate is omitted reference category. 
*p<.05,  **p<.01,  ***p<.001 (two-tailed test) 
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in adolescence (b=-1.01) and switching to no affiliation (b=-1.40) have robust, negative effects 
on identifying as a Republican rather than Independent/other party. No affiliation in 
adolescence is associated with a 65% reduction in the odds of identifying as Republican rather 
than Independent/other party, and switching to no affiliation is associated with a 75% 
reduction in the relative odds of identifying as Republican. As noted above, almost 12% of 
respondents “don’t know” their political orientation. The final model shows that both being 
unaffiliated in adolescence (b=.47) and switching to no affiliation (b=.46) have positive effects 
on not knowing one’s political orientation. Specifically, no affiliation as an adolescent is 
associated with a 60% increase in the odds of not knowing one’s political party, and switching 
to no affiliation is associated with a 58% increase.  
Overall, the results in Table 3 suggest that religiously unaffiliated emerging adults are 
relatively liberal, unlikely to identify as Republican, and likely to say they do not know their 
party or orientation. Post-hoc tests show that the coefficients for unaffiliated as an adolescent 
and switching to no affiliation from the models in Tables 3 are not significantly different from 
one another. The control variables indicate that women, racial minorities, the highly educated, 
and those with liberal parents are relatively liberal, and emerging adults who are married, have 
children, and have conservative parents are relatively conservative. Higher education and 
having liberal parents are also negatively associated with not knowing both one’s party and 
political orientation.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
The results in this article demonstrate robust differences in political participation, 
orientation, and partisanship between emerging adults with no religious affiliation and those 
who are affiliated with an organized religion. Emerging adults with no religious affiliation are 
relatively unlikely to talk about politics with their families, to vote, and to expect to vote in 
future elections. Additionally, unaffiliated emerging adults are relatively likely to report that 
they do not know their political party and orientation, which may be further evidence of their 
political apathy. These findings paint a bleak picture of the future of American democracy. 
Compared to other western, advanced industrialized democracies, the rate of voter turnout in 
the U.S. is already relatively low (Dalton). With continued growth in religious non-affiliation 
and the replacement of older birth cohorts with younger cohorts composed of larger numbers 
of unaffiliated, these results suggest that voter turnout is likely to remain low in the future, and 
perhaps diminish even further. The above results also show that unaffiliated emerging adults 
are highly partisan, as evidenced by their tendency to vote for the Democratic Party candidate 
(when they vote), report a liberal orientation, and not identify as Republican. This suggests 
that the U.S. population may become more liberal as the unaffiliated constitute a larger 
proportion of the population. At the same time, however, American politics may skew toward 
the right as left-leaning, unaffiliated emerging adults are relatively unlikely to be politically 
active.  
It is important to not overemphasize the immutability of the findings presented here. As 
Douglas Porpora’s article in this volume points out, secularism does not have to be an 
endpoint; it can instead be a stage in an individual’s spiritual and religious progression. It is 
thus possible, and even likely, that some unaffiliated emerging adults will return to religion as 
they age; or, for those who were raised with no religious affiliation, to affiliate with an 
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organized religion for the first time. Family formation in particular leads many secular 
Americans to embrace religion (Wilson and Sherkat). As unaffiliated emerging adults age, get 
married, and have children, some of them will choose to affiliate with a religion. It remains to 
be seen how their political activities and perspectives are affected by such life-course 
transitions. Moreover, the above results show that religiously affiliated and unaffiliated 
emerging adults express similar levels of political interest. This opens up the possibility that 
politically disengaged, unaffiliated emerging adults can be politically mobilized as they age. 
Finally, the robust association between non-affiliation and liberal political perspectives may be 
transitory for some emerging adults. As Paddy Gilger notes in his contribution to this volume, 
unaffiliated Americans are collectively empowered to perform and display secularity. As the 
unaffiliated population grows and matures, segments of the population may choose alternative 
ways to perform secularity, which might align with a more conservative political outlook. For 
instance, some unaffiliated Americans have already claimed the identity of “secular right” (e.g., 
http://secularright.org/SR/wordpress). On the other hand, Merino’s research shows that 
younger cohorts of unaffiliated Americans are more liberal than their predecessors, which 
suggests a lasting association between non-affiliation and liberal political perspectives.  
In this article, I sometimes used the term apostasy to refer to the act of switching to no 
affiliation. This term implies an active rejection of religion (Bromley). I believe the term is 
appropriate because emerging adults who switch to no affiliation have actively chosen to leave 
organized religion, or to disaffiliate. Still, as noted above, some unaffiliated Americans do hold 
religious beliefs. For instance, in the fourth wave of the NSYR, more than 40% of those who 
were unaffiliated as adolescents and more than 40% of those who switched to no affiliation 
report both believing in God and praying at least occasionally. Clearly not all apostates, as I 
am using the term here, are irreligious. They have rejected organized religion, but not 
necessarily religious beliefs and individualized religious practices such as prayer. The political 
apathy of unaffiliated emerging adults, however, may be part of a larger pattern of societal 
detachment. In other words, religious apostates may also be social apostates. Some researchers 
argue that the rise of secularism, and specifically non-affiliation, is the result of an anti-
institutionalism that took hold beginning in the 1960s (e.g., Fowler et al.). There is some 
support for this perspective in the NSYR data. For instance, in the fourth wave of the NSYR 
there are large differences in marriage rates by religious affiliation: 29.4% of the affiliated, 
20.8% of those unaffiliated in adolescence, and 18.3% of religious apostates are married (chi-
square=28.134, p<.001). Future research should further investigate the potential lack of social 
participation – broadly defined – on the part of religiously unaffiliated emerging adults. 
The above results are complicated by the potential reciprocal association between 
religious and political affiliations. While social scientists studying religion and politics generally 
focus on the potential effects of religion on political perspectives, contemporary research 
notes that political perspectives can also influence religious beliefs and affiliations (e.g., Hout 
and Fischer; Patrikios). I have incorporated this possibility into the analysis by dividing the 
unaffiliated into those who were unaffiliated in adolescence, and thus potentially raised 
unaffiliated, and those who switched to no affiliation in emerging adulthood. The results show 
little difference in political activity and partisanship between those unaffiliated in adolescence 
and those who switch to no affiliation, which suggests that the effects of politics on religion 
are not driving the findings. While the politicization of religion in the 1970s and 1980s may 
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have led a notable number of liberals to disaffiliate from religion (Putnam and Campbell), the 
results here suggest that religious non-affiliation influences partisanship more than the other 
way around. Still, future research can build on these findings by explicitly modeling the 
reciprocal association between religious and political perspectives across the life course. 
This article expands understanding of the ways in which religious non-affiliation 
influences political perspectives and activities. Demographic projections indicate that a large 
minority of Americans will have no religious affiliation as we move into the mid part of the 
twenty-first century (Pew Research Center 2015b). The findings here suggest that such 
prominence of non-affiliation will likely have a significant impact on American politics. The 
health of our democracy appears to be in danger as the already low levels of democratic 
participation may be further diminished by large numbers of politically disengaged, unaffiliated 
Americans. On the other hand, the finding that the religiously affiliated and unaffiliated report 
similar levels of political interest provides some hope that democratic participation may not 
dwindle. Perhaps this abstract political interest can be mobilized into political participation by 
the growing number of organizations aimed at secular Americans (Cimino and Smith), or by 
having secular role models among prominent politicians, which has thus far been relatively 
rare (Davidson, Kraus, and Morrissey). Democracies flourish when there is an active citizenry 
(Verba, Schlozman, and Brady). It therefore behooves researchers, activists, and politicians to 
identify ways to encourage political participation among seemingly politically apathetic, 
religiously unaffiliated Americans. 
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